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Waste and Duplication in NASA Programs:  The Need to Enhance U.S. Space 
Program Efficiency 
Abstract: The U.S. Government faces acute budgetary deficits and national debt 
problems in the Obama Administration’s second term.  These problems have 
been brought about by decades of unsustainable government spending affecting 
all federal agencies including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA).    An outgrowth of this fiscal profligacy is the presence of wasteful and 
duplicative programs within NASA that prevent this agency from achieving its 
space science and human spaceflight objectives.  These programs occur due to 
mismanagement of these programs by NASA and from the creation of these 
programs by the U.S. Congress and congressional committees.  This occurs 
because congressional appropriators tend to be more concerned with 
economically enhancing their states and districts and promoting their reelections 
instead of providing effectively targeted funding and oversight of their programs 
to ensure they meet national space policy goals and provide tangible value for 
taxpayers.  This work will examine recent examples of wasteful and duplicative 




     The U.S. Government faces acute budgetary and national debt pressures  
during early 2014.  The federal budget deficit is $301 billion representing 1.75% of 
a $17,649.6 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  as of April 30, 2014[1] and the 
national debt exceeded $17.472 trillion as of May 12, 2014 having risen from to 
this level from $10.626 trillion since the beginning of the Obama 
Administration[2]  This situation requires federal agencies and congressional 
appropriators to carefully scrutinize federal programs for duplication and waste 
and determining whether they are critical enough to spend taxpayer dollars on 
during this period of protracted fiscal restraint.  All federal agencies, to varying 
degrees, are being forced to reduce the growth of their expenditures, if not their 
actual expenditures, by political and economic constraints such as 2012 federal 
budget sequestration legislation.  In March 2013, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) reported that the 5% of its Fiscal Year (FY) budget of 
$17.896 billion which it was required to sequester was $918 million [3]. 
     NASA is one agency being forced to cope with heightened scrutiny of its 
programs.  While it has had significant scientific and political successes during its 
more than half century history, NASA has not been immune to programmatic 
waste, duplication, inefficiency, and uncertain institutional purpose during this 
time period.  This article will examine recent and ongoing problems NASA has 
with waste and duplication which, if allowed to persist, will jeopardize its ability 
to meet national space policy objectives and maintain political support for 
continued funding of its programs which can be seen by Americans irrelevant to 
their daily needs.  NASA’s ambivalent popular standing is reflected in recent 
public opinion polling.  A March 2012 General Social Survey Poll asking U.S. 
Government space exploration spending found 40% of respondents saying the 
U.S. was spending the right amount while 29% said it was spending too much.  A 
May 2013 Gallup Poll seeking public opinion on NASA’s performance found that 
32% of respondents had a good opinion of NASA; 32% had a fair opinion of NASA; 
and 10% had a poor opinion of NASA.  Finally, an October 2013 Pew Research 
Center poll on overall opinion of NASA revealed 22% held a very favorable 
opinion; 51% a mostly favorable opinion; 3% a very unfavorable opinion; and 12% 
a mostly unfavorable opinion of this agency[4]. 
     Duplication and waste is common to NASA and other federal agencies. 
Documentation on such duplication and waste can be found in many sources 
including U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, agency inspector 
general (IG) reports, and congressional committee publications.  An important 
factor to remember is that responsibility for much of this duplication and waste 
occurs through congressional earmarking as part of annual federal appropriations 
as members of Congress seek to enhance economic development in their states 
and districts and their own reelection prospects by placing NASA facilities in their 
constituencies (particularly in southern and western states) and maintaining 
government spending for these facilities even if they no longer meet national 
space policy needs[5].   
2. Multifaceted Waste and Duplication 
     GAO is responsible for issuing numerous reports on the management 
performance of government programs.  A particularly important category of 
reports GAO issues are its High Risk reports.  This series of reports are issued 
approximately every two years at the beginning of each two year congressional 
session.  Their purpose is documenting “high risk” government operations and 
focusing on government agencies and program areas which achieve the high risk 
category due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement 
or are in acute need of broad reform.  The “high risk” reports have been issued 
from 1990 until 2013 and various NASA programs have been included on this list 
every time[6]. 
     NASA acquisition management programs were targeted as high risk in the 
February 2013 edition of these GAO reports.  These programs were targeted as 
high risk due to NASA’s continuing history of persistent cost growth and 
scheduling delays in the majority of its major programs.  GAO asserts that various 
causal factors including obsolescent financial management systems, poor cost 
estimating, and underestimating risks associated with developing major systems 
keep NASA acquisition management programs in the high risk category[7].    
     GAO credited NASA for meeting cost and schedule baselines in 2011 for the 
Juno and the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory spacecraft projects.  
However, GAO also determined that same year that NASA increased lifecycle 
costs of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) by $3.7 billion and a 52 month 
launch delay.  In December 2012, GAO reported that JWST costing and scheduling 
confidence developing and scheduling levels could impact the program’s overall 
reliability.  GAO also mentioned that in 2011 NASA lacked common measurable 
and proven criteria such as engineering drawings employed at a key point in the 
development lifecycle to give decision-makers requisite knowledge, insight, and 
evidence to allow individual projects to proceed[8]. 
     Since 2011 GAO has also issued annual reports on government agency program 
duplication and included recommendations for eliminating this duplication.  In its 
April 2013 report on this topic, GAO focused on the possibility of reducing 
government satellite program costs.  Besides NASA, federal agencies involved in 
using satellite assets and technologies for various programs include the 
Department of Defense (DOD), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the U.S. Coast Guard.  In 
recent years, over $25 billion annually has been appropriated to agencies for 
developing space systems.  These systems are launched and put into orbit by 
rockets  which can cost from $80-$200 million per launch[9]. 
     Recommendations from GAO to reduce such duplication and costs include 
launching government payloads on commercial space industry satellites; 
increased launch ride-sharing by federal agencies, and resolving agency cultural 
challenges such as DOD being reluctant to adopt technologies from unfamiliar 
commercial providers.  Additional complicating factors include government 
agencies being concerned that commercial agencies may not be flexible about 
changing launch dates if instruments or satellites experience delays and existing 
federal legal and policy challenges such as the 2004 U.S. Space Transportation 
Policy mandating that government payloads be launched on U.S. manufactured 
space launch vehicles unless otherwise exempted[10]. 
     GAO noted that while the U.S. Space Transportation Policy was intended to 
support the U.S. space industry, it limits the government’s ability to utilize 
available foreign commercial launch options which commercial satellite providers 
take advantage of.  GAO recommends that Congress and the President should 
consider revisiting U.S. space transportation law and policy to give federal 
agencies additional flexibility to use foreign space transportation and launch 
vehicles to encourage cost savings.  GAO believes hosted payloads and ride 
sharing could reduce government launch costs and produce savings in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars over project lifespans but is unable to quantify the 
potential for further financial benefits due to a limited pool of available data[11]. 
     Political figures like to target what they consider as wasteful government  
spending and NASA was heavily criticized by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) in the 
October 2012 edition of the Waste Book compiled by his staff.  One example of 
questionable NASA spending cited in this presentation included $947,000 to 
researchers at Cornell University and the University of Hawaii as part of NASA’s 
Advanced Food and Technology Project to develop recipes for pizza and other 
foods that could be served on Mars even though human expeditions to Mars are 
not likely until the 2030s.  Other characteristics of this program included six 
volunteers heading to a barren area of Hawaii to simulate a 120-day Mars 
mission, wearing space suits, and consuming only instant foods and foods 
prepared from shelf stable ingredients in order to determine the best food 
options for long-term travel to Mars and eating on this planet[12]. 
     This report also revealed NASA had spent $1.5 million developing a massive 
multiplayer online game simulating a journey to Mars and astronauts life on that 
planet; developed the online rock radio station Third Rock with a Houston 
company targeting 18-34 year olds which is accessible on mobile phone apps; the 
NASA website, and iTunes, and spent $94,000 developing a Mars Rover video 
game for Xbox[13].  It also spends $771,000 annually for an obsolete and poorly 
used “Lessons Learned” database allowing NASA managers to document best 
practices and other information gained from completed projects.  NASA’s IG, 
however reports that these managers rarely contribute to or access this database 
and that agency employees found it to be user unfriendly and unhelpful[14]. 
     NASA has also spent $12.4 million funding a cutting edge visitor center to 
replace an existing facility five miles away from the Stennis Space Center in 
Mississippi.  Despite receiving approximately 100 visitors per day in 2007, NASA 
and other federal, Mississippi state agencies, and private organizations 
collaborated to build a new 72,000 square foot science center which opened in 
2012.  The new facility is five times larger than the previous visitors center and 
aspires to attract over 300,000 visitors annually[15]  
3. Unused and Ineffectively Used Facilities 
     NASA’s real estate holdings encompass eighteen facilities in Washington, DC  
and the following twelve states:  Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana,  
Maryland, Mississippi, Ohio, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Virginia, and West  
Virginia[16].  These make NASA the U.S. Government’s ninth largest real property 
holder with over 124,000 acres  and 4,900 buildings and other structures whose 
replacement value exceeds $30 billion[17].  Over 80% of these facilities are forty 
or more years old and NASA faces a deferred maintenance backlog of $2.5 billion.  
The 2010 NASA Authorization Act required the agency to reduce its real property 
to fit current and future missions and expected funding levels.  NASA’s OIG warns 
that with mission focus changes and budget constraints NASA managers must 
balance reducing its real property footprint with retaining and maintaining 
currently underutilized facilities which may be needed to support future 
missions[18]. 
     Specific concerns this report found with NASA property management practices 
include: 
• Not having clear guidance to ensure that property identified for leasing to 
prospective commercial users was not excess to agency needs; 
• NASA guidance for identifying potential lease property is clear and 
ineffective; 
• NASA lacks a comprehensive inventory of property available for lease.  For 
instance, managers at its Ames, Kennedy, and Stennis facilities only had 
partial inventories of buildings or land available for lease while managers 
at the Glenn and Michoud facilities were unable to provide a formal 
inventory of available products. 
• Centers inadequately market their properties for leasing.  They generally 
relied on “word-of-mouth” efforts to attract prospective tenants and did 
not take additional steps to enhance marketing of leasing opportunities 
such as working with the General Services Administration’s Office of Client 
Solutions to identify potential federal clients. 
• Internal controls need to be strengthened to ensure best value to the 
government and fairness to partners.  Centers did not consistently use 
competition for agreements with non-federal entities, three Centers failed 
to conduct a required market analysis or used the analysis inappropriately 
when developing pricing, and three of the Centers entered into lease 
agreements signed by unauthorized personnel[19]. 
     Additional problems in NASA property leasing include funds generated from 
such leases going directly to the U.S. Treasury instead of to NASA; parts of its 
Ames Center in California being part of the Shenandoah Plaza Historic District 
which NASA is required to preserve under federal law; not using the government 
website FedBizOpps  https://www.fbo.gov/ to market to non-federal entities; and 
Mississippi’s Stennis facility charging Rolls Royce $2.14 annually per square foot 
for office space when a local market analysis prepared by officials 40 miles away 
at New Orleans-based Michoud, determined that their local office space rents 
ranged between $8.50 and $13.50 per square foot[20]. 
4. Constellation Program/Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) 
     NASA’s Constellation and MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) programs have  
also been plagued with management problems.  Constellation’s origins begin with  
the desire to replace the space shuttle.  Early articulation  of this was specified by 
President George W. Bush in his January 2004 “Vision for Space Exploration” 
which emphasized sending NASA astronauts beyond low earth orbit.  
Characteristics of this vision included developing a Crew Exploration Vehicle 
(CEV), later renamed Orion, to provide transportation for missions beyond the 
International Space Station and low earth orbit; conduct an initial crewed Orion 
flight by 2014; conduct lunar surface exploration between 2015-2020; and 
conduct human missions to Mars after successfully demonstrating sustained 
missions to the Moon and robotic missions to Mars[21]. 
     Lockheed Martin was chosen as the contractor to develop Orion in 2006 and its 
first crewed flight was scheduled for 2012.  However, the program has been 
plagued by delays and cost increases due, in part, to its design requirements 
focusing on exploration beyond low-earth orbit.  Orion was initially intended to 
have a crew of six which was reduced to four to save weight.  It’s proposed launch 
vehicles were called Ares I and Ares V and patterned after the Space Shuttle’s 
solid rocket boosters, external tank, and propulsion systems[22]. 
     Ares experienced a mostly successful launch in October 2009 but overall 
Constellation program costs reached $9 billion as of February 2010[23].  This 
program has received numerous critical evaluations for uncertain cost estimates, 
cost growth, major technical problems, and consisted delayed timelines.  A July 
2006 GAO report to the House of Representatives Science Committee’s chair and 
ranking members determined that NASA could not give a firm estimate of what it 
will take to meet Constellation program architecture within its projected budget 
estimated at $31 billion through Fiscal Year 2011[24]. 
     In April 2009, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a report saying that 
meeting Bush Administration “Vision for Space Exploration” goals would require 
NASA to reduce its aeronautics research and science budgets by over 40%.  CBO 
went on to mention that current NASA program development costs would 
increase by 50% on average saying that if overall annual NASA funding was 
maintained at $19.1 billion and NASA realized cost growth consistent with 
historical data, that its planned exploration schedules would be significantly 
delayed.   It went on to contend that Ares I and Orion launch would be delayed 
until at least late 2016, human return to the moon until 2023, and 15 of 79 
projected science missions would be delayed past 2025[25].  
    An August 2009 GAO report mentioned that Ares I and Orion represent up to 
$49 billion of the estimated $97 billion to be spent on Constellation through 2020.  
It went on to add that even though it has spent over $10 billion in program 
contracts, that NASA did not know how much Ares I and Orion would cost until 
technical and design problems were addressed[26].  These continual problems 
with Constellation resulted in its congressional cancellation in the 2010 NASA 
Authorization Act[27]. 
     Section 303 of this statute directed NASA to develop the Orion Multi-Purpose 
Crew Vehicle (MPCV) to use existing contracts, investments, workforce, and 
capabilities from Constellation and the Space Shuttle programs to achieve full 
operational capability for MPCV by December 31, 2016 with the following 
minimum capabilities funded at $1.2 billion annually for Fiscal Years 2011-2013: 
• Serving as the primary crew vehicle for missions beyond low Earth orbit; 
• Conducting regular in-space operations, including rendezvous, docking, and 
extra-vehicular activities and delivering payloads to the International Space 
Station (ISS); 
• Providing an alternative means of delivering crew and cargo to ISS if 
commercial or partner-supplied vehicles cannot; and 
• Having the capacity for efficient and timely evolution including insertion of 
new technologies[28]. 
     Three years after its creation, MPCV faces continuing problems.  A March 2012 
GAO report noted that, contrary to congressional intent, that MPCV’s first non-
crewed flight is not scheduled until 2017 and the first crewed flight until 2021.  In 
addition, MPCV budget estimates for short-term planning were found to be 
sufficient but inadequate for developing a program baseline.  At this time, NASA 
had not conducted a program risk analysis and program financial reserves were 
determined to be insufficient.   Further complicating matters is the program not 
having a specific mission guiding its design.  GAO contended that NASA was 
currently considering 15 potential missions ranging from ISS low earth orbit 
utilizations, to lunar surface operations, to landing on Mars[29]. 
     Congressional frustration with MPCV program development has been acute.  
On May 18, 2011, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee 
and its Space Subcommittee’s chair and ranking member sent a letter to NASA 
Administrator Charles Bolden expressing displeasure with program progress.  
They requested that NASA provide them and committee staff with bi-monthly 
meetings on program developments and demanded information on the progress 
of various reports required by the 2010 NASA Act by June 3, 2011[30].  NASA 
provided only a partial response to the May 18 letter and withheld documents 
describing its compliance with the 2010 law.   This resulted in a subsequent June 
22, 2011 letter from Senators Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-
TX), the Committee’s chair and ranking member, to Boldin informing him that the 
committee would subpoena him if these documents were not received by June 
27, 2011[31].  The committee subsequently issued a subpoena on July 27, 
2011[32]. 
     On September 14, 2011, NASA announced the design of its commercial launch 
system but this could not stop continued congressional frustration with NASA 
over MPCV program progress.   This was reflected in a September 12, 2012 
hearing by the House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Space and 
Aeronautics as Committee Chair Rep. Ralph Hall (R-TX) noted saying he could see 
no evidence that MPCV service module development which is required to support 
multiday missions has begun, that NASA had not designated a mission beyond 
landing on an asteroid, and that it was unbelievable that a trip beyond low-earth 
orbit would not include the moon as a destination[33]. 
     NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development 
Dan Dumbacher attempted to assuage committee concerns by saying that the 
MPCV’s Orion service module  would be used in a uncrewed flight exploration test 
in 2014 which would be a two-orbit high-energy reentry test mission intended to 
obtain critical performance data to confirm spacecraft design and eventually 
reduce cost.  Lockheed Martin Vice President and Orion Program Manager Cleon 
Lacefield appealed to congressional parochialism by emphasizing business 
suppliers in 41 states contributed to Orion program development and that 
program testing occurred in states such as Alabama, Colorado, Florida, 
Mississippi, and Virginia[34].   
     Subcommittee Chair Rep. Steve Palazzo (R-MS) asked Dumbacher how MPCV 
and related NASA programs can address development challenges occurring under 
flat funding through the scheduled December 2017 uncrewed flight.  Dumbacher 
contended that this program was set to deliver on its planned 2017 and 2021 
launches stressing the critical importance of funding stability to meet program 
objectives.  He also reassured Rep. Mo Brooks (R-AL) that the Obama 
Administration was committed to this program and that it would not be cancelled 
as Constellation was[35]. 
     Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) expressed concern about the lack of certainty in 
MPCV program budget requests and questioned whether MPCV could be 
launched from existing Delta rocket assets.  Rep. Hanson Clarke (D-MI) expressed 
concern with avionic and electronic supply chain problems this program has had 
finding such materials in the U.S[36]. 
     Continuing concern about MPCV viability was expressed an August 2013 NASA 
OIG report.  Programmatic technical risks documented in this analysis include: 
• Spacecraft weight exceeding launch safety recommendations by 7%; 
• Vehicle Test and Verification Plan being high risk because of eliminating or 
combining several tests due to funding constraints; 
• The Avcoat heat shield, serving as a protective barrier during atmospheric 
reentry, has shown tendencies to crack under thermal conditions 
comparable to those the capsule will experience in the deep space 
environment prior to reentering the Earth’s atmosphere; 
• The heat shield production schedule may not be completed and delivered 
to the Kennedy launch center in time to begin assembly, testing, and launch 
operations due to parts availability, fabrication complexity, and staffing and 
training problems.  Avocoat’s material uniqueness gives NASA no substitute 
material alternatives; and 
• Computer systems problems in managing engineering data and drawings 
cause design engineers to experience 3-5 hours of delays when trying to 
extract drawings from the database.  This increases the possibility that a 
December 2017 scheduled flight date cannot be met[37]. 
     A related program impacting MPCV is the Ares I mobile launcher which will 
launch MPCV.  NASA OIG has emphasized that NASA has generally met cost, 
schedule, and performance milestones for this launcher.  However, it also 
cautioned that NASA’s ability to identify additional technical risks in modifying the 
launcher and accurately estimate future operating costs through the program life 
cycle is limited by the launch program’s relative immaturity and the evolvable 
nature of these vehicles.  OIG urged NASA to develop a functional Exploration 
Systems Integration Strategy to monitor planned modifications and related cost 
estimates and that failure by MPCV and other programs to effectively 
communicate their requirements will compromise the accuracy of mobile 
launcher budget and schedule estimates and overall program utility[38]. 
5. James Webb Space Telescope 
     The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), mentioned earlier, has also proven 
to be financially and managerially problematic.  JWST was originally called the 
Next Generation Space Telescope and its provenance dates back to 1997 when its 
cost was projected at $500 million and launch date was scheduled for 2007.  JWST 
was intended to be the Hubble Space Telescope’s successor and its main technical 
features included a 6.5 meter diameter mirror optimized for observing  infrared 
light which Hubble could not and orbit nearly one million miles from earth which 
would enable it to produce scientific discoveries, glimpsing the origins of galaxies, 
and providing insights into early planet and star formation[39].   
     This telescope was identified as a top priority in the National Academy of 
Science’s 2001 Decadal Survey Astronomy and Astrophysics in the New Millenium 
with an estimated program cost of $1 billion[40].  However, the subsequent 
decade has seen JWST plagued by continual delays and cost increases.  In summer 
2002 the cost was estimated to be $2.5 billion; Northrop Grumman was awarded 
prime contractorship; and 2010 was targeted as the launch date.  By March 2005, 
NASA reported further cost growth and increasing life-cycle costs which reached 
$4.5 billion and a two-year schedule slippage.  During 2006, NASA appointed 
independent review teams who concluded that while JWST had sound scientific 
performance and technical content acute concerned over program early year 
funding constraints remained[41]. 
     A July 2008 program confirmation review placed JWST baseline lifecycle cost at 
$5 billion and launch date in June 2014.  In June 2010, Senator Barbara Mikulski 
(D-MD), the Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Justice, and Related Agencies requested an independent review of 
JWST.  An Independent Comprehensive Review Panel (ICRP) lead by John Casini, 
the Assistant to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory Director was established and it 
issued its report in October 2010.  ICRP report findings attributed JWST problems 
to budget and program management while praising its technical performance, 
noted that the earliest possible launch date was July 2015, that program costs 
would increase to between $6.2-6.8 billion, and restructuring JWST’s Project 
Office at the Goddard Space Flight Center to ensure its managed with emphasis 
on life cycle cost and launch readiness date[42]. 
     In September 2011 new JWST planning was reapproved with a new baseline 
cost estimate of $8.8 billion and an October 2018 launch readiness date.   
Testifying before the House Science Committee on December 6, 2011, NASA JWST 
Program Director Rick Howard stressed NASA’s determination to improve JWST’s 
program performance and delivery schedule for NASA, the Obama 
Administration, and Congress.  He went on to mention that remaining program 
technical challenges included developing and testing instruments, sunshield, 
spacecraft, and primary mirror backplane support structure, and integrating and 
testing systems for validating in-space performance and integrated observatory 
models.  Howard also stressed that JWST would be 100 times more sensitive than 
Hubble; that its mirror collecting area is six times larger than Hubble; that it will 
see solar systems forming in our galaxy; significantly advance dark matter and 
dark energy knowledge; and potentially detect the presence of liquid water on 
planets around other stars consequently indicating if such a planet could support 
life[43]. 
     Some committee members expressed skepticism when NASA witnesses were 
unable to specify what other NASA priority programs they favored reducing if 
JWST was such a high priority for NASA despite its repeated cost overruns within 
the context of multitrillion dollar national debt[44]. 
     A December 2012 GAO assessment of JWST revealed some improvements but 
continuing problems.  GAO said that the current program cost estimate is not fully 
consistent with some of the best practices for developing reliable and credible 
cost estimates.  It also mentioned that JWST has taken several steps to improve 
communications and project oversight with its contractors  including taking over 
responsibility for mission systems engineering from the prime contractor; 
instituting meetings including various levels of NASA, contractor, and 
subcontractor management; and implementing a new risk management system 
for facilitating better risk tracking[45]. 
     Remaining JWST problems include instrument difficulties having delayed the 
first integration and test effort; key long-term risk on subsystems requiring  
significant work which will not be completed until 2016; travel budget reductions 
may require JWST to adjust its oversight approach; and NASA officials not having 
a plan in place to address this contingency.  A key finding is that JWST will 
experience significant challenges throughout its duration given the significant size 
and complexity of remaining work with four of six major program systems:  
spacecraft, sunshield, ground system, and optical telescope element, and 
integrated science instrument module having nearly 50% or more of their work 
remaining based on current budget information[46]. 
6. Weather Satellite Management 
      NASA collaborates with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and the Air Force in managing the National Polar Orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite Program System (NPOESS) to provide critical forecasting 
and global climate monitoring through 2026.  This program began in 1994 when a 
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge existing 
satellite programs into a single program capable of meeting both civilian and 
military needs.  The contract for this was initially awarded in August 2002, but 
NPOESS has been plagued by continual problems including its cost estimate 
doubling to nearly $15 billion dollars; launch dates have been delayed by over 5 
years; significant functionality has been removed from the program; and GAO 
reported that the tri-agency management structure has proven ineffective in a 
September 11, 2013 report to the House Science Committee’s Chair and Ranking 
Member[47]. 
     These ongoing NPOESS problems were so persistently severe that GAO 
designated gaps in weather satellite data a high-risk problem in its February 2012 
High-Risk report series.  This designation occurred because there is a substantial 
risk of a gap in polar satellite data in the afternoon orbit; between the time the 
current polar satellite is expected to be in orbit and operational which could cover 
from 17-53 months or more depending on the current satellite’s lifespan and 
potential delays in launching or operating the new satellite.  Further coverage 
gaps may occur if forthcoming DOD satellites do not work as intended since two 
remaining satellites have been in storage for over a decade and will be old by the 
time of their launch.  In addition, NOAA officials contend a satellite data gap 
would produce less timely weather forecasts and warnings of extreme events 
including hurricanes, storm surges, and floods.  An example of the potential 
consequences of less timely and accurate weather forecasts was provided by the 
European Union supported European Centre for Medium Range Weather 
Forecasts which said NOAA forecasts of Hurricane Sandy’s Track could have been 
hundreds of miles off without polar-orbiting satellites and could have shown this 
storm remaining at sea instead of identifying a New Jersey landfall within 30 miles 
4 days before landfall[48]. 
     GAO recommended NOAA take the following steps to remove NPOESS from 
the High-Risk designation including: 
• Deciding whether and how to expend support for legacy satellite systems 
so their data could be available if needed; 
• How much time and money it must invest in improving satellite models so 
they can assimilate data from alternative sources; 
• Determine whether to pursue international agreements for access to other 
satellite systems and the best way to resolve security problems with foreign 
data; 
• When and how to test the value and integration of alternative data sources’ 
and; 
• How such preliminary mitigation plans are to be integrated with long-term 
agency plans for sustaining weather forecasting capabilities and identifying 
time frames when such decisions will be made[49]. 
     Congressional frustration with NPOESS was noted in a June 27, 2012 hearing 
when Rep. Paul Broun (R-GA), the chair of the House Science Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, noted that this was the ninth 
hearing held on this program and its predecessor since 2003 and this did not 
include hearings held on the Geostationary Observational Environmental Satellite 
(GOES-R) weather satellites in general.  Broun went on to maintain that NPOESS 
was originally supposed to produce six satellites operating in three separate 
orbits, carry thirteen instruments, and launch in 2010 before lamenting that it 
now only had three satellites, operated in one orbit, cost twice as much as 
intended, and did not have a baseline cost or schedule[50]. 
     He also went on to mention that the Senate Appropriations Committee had 
proposed transferring weather satellite programs from NOAA to NASA, that the 
Obama Administration had proposed moving NOAA to the Interior Department, 
and that the Senate proposed removing the satellite program from NOAA 
consequently removing $2 billion of that agency’s $5 billion budget.  In addition, 
he contrasted NPOESS’ anemic performance which he noted appeared to be 
progressing in delivering its spacecraft and ground system within cost and 
schedule[51]. 
     September 2013 GAO recommendations on NPOESS recommended the 
following actions to NOAA: 
• Tracking the extent key satellite data users groups are using the Suomi 
National Polar-Orbiting Partnership and Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) 
products and obtaining feedback on these products; 
• Establishing a complete JPSS program integrated master schedule which 
includes logically linked sequence of activities; 
• Addressing shortfalls in ground system and spacecraft component 
schedules; 
• Completing the integrated master schedule and addressing component 
schedule shortfalls and updating the JPSS-1 joint cost and schedule 
confidence levels if warranted and justified; and 
• Establishing a comprehensive contingency plan for potential satellite data 
gaps in polar orbit including specific contingency actions and defined roles, 
responsibilities, timelines, and triggers, along with analysis of the impact of 
lost data from morning orbits[52]. 
7. Congressional Dysfunction 
Although NASA has frequently exhibited poor management performance in 
producing program delay and waste, this is at least equally matched by 
congressional oversight and budgetary dysfunction.  A key problem is congress’ 
troubled annual agency budget appropriation process.  Congress passes agency 
appropriation bills in twelve separate chunks covering multiple agencies.  For 
instance, NASA’s budget is part of annual budget appropriations for agencies 
including the Commerce and Justice Departments and science agencies[53].  The 
appropriations process gives committees the ability to place significant and often 
burdensome controls on agencies ability to spend and transfer funds, and restrict 
agencies room to maneuver which has often produced presidential signing 
statements expressing frustration with certain legislative limitations on agency 
programming[54]. 
     When these factors are added with significant personnel changes on relevant 
committees, the desire of committee members and staff for career advancement, 
volatility in partisan control of Congress and the presidency over the past decade, 
and conflict between the House and Senate stemming from volatility in partisan 
control over these chambers from 2007-present, it is no wonder NASA and other 
federal agencies have had difficulty fulfilling their operational responsibilities.  
The last time a “clean” NASA budget was agreed to by Congress and signed by the 
President was Public Law 109-108 signed by President George W. Bush on 
October 22, 2005[55]. 
     During the subsequent decade, NASA’s annual appropriation bill has been 
inserted into either omnibus appropriation bills or continuing resolutions due to 
the failure of presidential and congressional leadership of both parties to achieve 
agreement on program funding levels and oversight priorities to achieve timely 
funding for NASA programs within the traditional budget process.  The regular use 
of continuing resolutions makes it necessary for some programs to be funded for 
as little as a few weeks until lengthier appropriations periods can be achieved.  
This has made it difficult for NASA and other agencies to develop continuity and 
efficiency in program performance management due to irregular and frequently 
dysfunctional congressional leadership and oversight in providing consistent 
funding streams for agency programs[56]. 
     A further example of dysfunctional congressional oversight affecting NASA is 
the excessive number of reports it requires NASA to compile.  A May 4, 2014 
Washington Post story mentioned that the number of congressionally required 
federal agency reports has risen from 303 in 1928, to 759 in 1970, to 3,448 by 
1990, to 4,673 by  April 2014[57].  Examples of legally mandated reports NASA  
was required to file to Congress in 2013 included the semiannual Activities Report 
of NASA’s Inspector General,  a report determining if it’s in the public interest to 
use noncompetitive procedures for a specific procurement, a report documenting 
the disposal of land exceeding $50,000, a strategic plan for minimizing job losses 
when the space shuttle transfers to a successor program, reports on NASA’s 
contribution to innovation and its establishment of space settlements, and 
collaborations on biomedical research with the former Soviet Union.  It defies 
logic to expect the members and staff of the House and Senate Science 
Committees and their appropriations committees to have time to read and digest 
all of these reports to perform effective oversight.  Congress must examine which 
reports can be consolidated or eliminated to facilitate more effective 
oversight[58]. 
8. Conclusion 
     Like all federal agencies, NASA faces acute management challenges and fiscal 
constraints in an era of increasing public skepticism about its programs and U.S. 
Government programs in general.  NASA must restructure itself to improve its 
managerial efficiency and institutional viability.  It should explore consolidating its 
geographically dispersed facilities even if this causes economic and political pain 
in the communities and congressional districts where these facilities are located.  
NASA should also transfer its aeronautics programs, whose budgets are expected 
to average $566 million per year through FY 2018 to the Federal Aviation 
Administration so it can concentrate exclusively on space science and policy.  
NASA should also make prudent and selective use of the U.S. commercial space 
industry which generated $340 million in revenue during 2013 to expedite launch 
schedules and allied foreign countries commercial space industries[59]. 
     Congressional oversight committees and appropriators need to make sure they 
fund space programs which are truly oriented toward advancing national space 
policy goals instead of serving as economic stimuli for local programs for 
advancing their reelection prospects.  These programs must use top private sector 
best practices in project management and administration and Congress must 
implement and strictly enforce program progress and spending goals to ensure 
taxpayers receive tangible results on how their tax dollars are spent.  Congress 
must also be willing to terminate these programs if they exceed spending targets 
and fall behind in achieving program goals regardless of how politically unpopular 
such action may be or how scientifically meritorious such programs may be. 
     Considering the problems NASA has had with NPOESS, it should withdraw from 
this program and let it be administered by NOAA and DOD and explore possible 
cooperation with the European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts. 
JWST should have October 2018 set as its final launch date or face potential  
termination and the MPCV should also have a specific initial launch date set in 
2017 as mentioned in the 2012 GAO report on this program or face termination.     
     NASA’s space programs must be seen by the public as being timely and cost 
effective and meeting national space priorities if they are to survive in these 
fiscally constrained times.  NASA, the Presidential Office of Science and 
Technology (OSTP) and congressional oversight and appropriation committees 
must work diligently, collaboratively, and with realistic goals to achieve these 
objectives if the U.S. civilian space program is to survive.   These same 
prescriptions for timeliness, fiscal and managerial efficiency, and realistically 
meeting broad national objectives, instead of parochial local interests, also apply 
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